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SPECIAL LECTURE.

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General Sir WILLIAM J. CODRINGTON, G.C.B., &c., &c., &c., Vice-President, in the Chair.

A VOLUNTEER FORCE, BRITISH AND COLONIAL, IN THE EVENT OF WAR.

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IT has been somewhat difficult to find a heading for this paper that will explain the views that are intended to be set forth, and therefore I may as well say that the scheme which I propose to bring under your notice this afternoon, is one for subsidising an expeditionary force of regular troops (supposing such a force should ever be necessary) by representative bodies of our volunteers, drawn not only from the mother country, but from her great colonies. I do not venture to propound this plan otherwise than to provoke the criticism, and to draw forth the opinions of the experienced soldiers who would be called upon to command and to organise our forces in the event of war, as well as of those, who brought into contact with the class that compose the strength of our volunteers, will be able to speak authoritatively of its desirability and even of its possibility. The difficulties that may attend it are doubtless great, the objections to it are probably numerous, but if there be a germ of practicability about such a scheme the sooner this germ ripens into fruit by the assistance of friendly criticism, the better it will be, and if there be no reality about it, the quicker it is consigned to the limbo where ill-digested and useless plans lie, the better it will also be.

Before attempting to set forth any details, I must, in order to defend the position I intend to take up, endeavour to lay down a few general principles. Owing to facility of communication, denseness of population, and the power that mechanical skill has afforded of arming, supplying, and transporting vast numbers of men, and of providing unlimited quantities of material, the armies now placed in the field are far larger than any that have ever been organised in former

periods of European history; whilst in place of fighting their battles with troops removed for long periods of service from civil life, continental nations vie with each other in sweeping into the net of conscription the larger portion of their male population. Happily our insular position enables us to avoid (at all events for the present) this method of converting nations into armed camps, thereby sapping their energies and rendering war almost preferable to armed peace. We are content with a comparatively small army raised from what I must call—in fault of a better word—our poorer classes, and to supplement this army by a militia also formed from similar materials, and by our volunteers, who furnish an outlet for the military instincts of the middle strata of our society; whilst we leave our great colonies to manage their own affairs, without endeavouring to unite them in any imperial scheme of mutual defence—gradually, and by a method peculiarly our own—of improving, without revolutionising—we ar ebringing together a portion of these heterogeneous bodies into something like a cohesive force; but war may not wait for the perfecting of our plans, and we may be called upon to take the field before our organisation has advanced beyond its elementary processes. For merely defensive warfare, plans have doubtless been prepared, and the recent mobilisation scheme shows that the utility of what are called our auxiliary forces has been partially recognised. But when has England waited to be attacked? Has she not interests to guard beyond the four seas: outposts to garrison, on the defence of which the vitality of our Empire depends, and even a policy to support that may lead to our selecting for the seat of war a foreign country rather than our own fields. For such a war expeditionary forces proportionate to the strength of a mighty nation will be necessary, and every energy will be taxed to supply means for rendering them sufficiently powerful to meet the hordes that conscription has enabled our continental neighbours to place under arms. Our regular troops will be augmented, our militia mobilized and increased in numbers, and all the inducements that pay and bounty can afford will be tried, to swell the ranks and supply the needs of our Army and of our Navy. But how can we compete with the product of the wide net of conscription, through whose meshes so few fish can escape, unless we utilize our middle classes, and avail ourselves of at least a small portion of the vast organisation that has placed so many of them under arms! Why also should we not welcome among our first line, the sons of those enterprising men who have extended the influence and power of England through so many distant lands, and have inherited with the warlike instincts of their race, the loyalty that would impel them to great sacrifices, in the event of danger to the country that they still look on as home?

Since the last great wars of the French revolution, the total population of England has not only increased enormously in numbers, but the middle class which now forms the bulk of our volunteer forces has augmented in an even higher ratio. The threat of invasion in 1859 called forth its warlike instincts, and gradually but steadily the organisation it adopted has risen in efficiency, and the force has shewn itself

more and more alive to the reality of the work that may possibly await it. There are doubtless great differences in the efficiency of regiments, but the majority of those officers who have had opportunities of commanding brigades composed of volunteers will I feel sure bear evidence of their discipline, and aptitude to learn, and of the willingness with which they will make sacrifices for the sake of instruction in their military duties. The liking for display and for what may be called the showy externals of a military career, have in great measure given place to a sense of the reality of their work, and the more this reality is brought home to the members of the force, the greater will be their zeal, and the higher their standard of efficiency. It is well understood in all countries, that to keep a picked body of troops, such as those that do duty as guards to the sovereign, up to the proper mark, the feeling that in times of danger, they will be the first to be sent on service, is of the most vital importance, and on a somewhat similar principle the dangers of active service ought to be faced by the peculiarly constituted force represented by the English volunteers. War is a great leveller, distinction of class, advantages of social position, the possession of wealth, and of the capacity for enjoying it, all vanish before the exigencies of service, and the very fact that the volunteer regiments include among their rank and file men of a higher social grade than the regulars and the militia, points to the desirability of giving them opportunities of facing danger, and of showing that they are worthy of the advantages that Providence has bestowed upon them. That this feeling exists among the members of the force is evidenced by the increased impetus that even a vague prospect of service gives to their recruiting, and by the additional and self-imposed work which many of the Officers and men undertake when war on the continent shows even a slight chance of military employment. What the French describe as the baptism of fire, applied even to a small portion of the force, would do more to increase the popularity and raise the standard of the volunteers, than years of drill and preparation. It would augment their prestige, would create traditions of danger faced and of glory won, and would stamp on them a reality which subsequent years of peace would fail to efface. I think that it is hardly necessary to pursue further this portion of the subject, the fact is so indubitable that few will be disposed to question it, and if I may be allowed, I will assume that solely with the object of elevating the *morale* of the volunteers, the advantage of employing a portion of the force on the first opportunity that war affords (putting aside for the present all difficulties in carrying out the plan) is indisputable, and may be taken for granted.

There are, however, other aspects of the question, which naturally occur to all who think it over. In the first place would a force composed of volunteers be able at the outbreak, or soon after the outbreak of hostilities, to take its place with regular troops? To this query I can well understand that many officers who have experience of soldiers, will feel some difficulty in giving a favourable reply. They know how long it takes to make an effective soldier, and how gradually discipline becomes inculcated into his mind by the daily,

strict, routine of drill and duty. From much experience, they are aware of the constant attention and careful supervision which the raw recruit requires to convert him from the yokel to the smart soldier, and they view with suspicion the royal road to learning which they think the volunteer is aiming at. These objections are well worthy of consideration and afford much scope for thought; but on the other hand the end in view must not be forgotten in testing the means employed, and the lessons of history ought to be carefully criticised and then duly appreciated. The aim of all military training is to produce a body of men who will face hardship, danger and death without question and without flinching. The ordinary weaknesses of the flesh have to be subdued by other impulses, and as the body is strengthened by exercise, so must the moral qualities of the soldier be fortified by the stimulants comprised in the comprehensive term of discipline, whilst his own self-reliance must be augmented by the belief that he is supported by men actuated by similar motives.

But men are differently constituted, and although in peace time, and having regard to the ordinary type of recruit, we grind all in the same mill, yet it does not follow that there may not be a shorter way of attaining a similar result. Among the numbers that compose the volunteer force, there must be many men who are imbued with a large share of what may be termed military instincts, but who are debarred by their position in life from taking service either as private soldiers, or as officers of the regular army. These men voluntarily attend many more than the prescribed number of drills, they also view their work in a more practical light than others who go through it in a perfunctory manner, consequently they are far in advance of their comrades, and are frequently on a par with men, who have engaged exclusively, at all events for a few years, in a military career. To these men the prospect of active employment would serve as a powerful incentive for renewed exertions. Their education, the feeling of responsibility which their status in society gives, and the additional stake they possess in the country, would all act as stimulants to enterprise, and would more than counterbalance the absence of a portion of the professional training which an ordinary recruit receives. Surely a brigade of men such as these, chosen from among the best volunteer regiments, of high physical qualities, and brought together, say for a fortnight's training under some energetic regular officer, would be welcomed by any general of division, and would be infinitely preferred to the foreign mercenary levies who augmented the numbers of the English Army at the close of the Crimean war; good as those troops doubtless were. And here I would observe that it appears to me unworthy of a great nation to fight its battles with troops that have nothing in common with it except the pay they receive, whilst it leaves untapped the mine of wealth that its middle classes present. Without doubt we have pursued this course in former wars, but it must be remembered that the principal recruiting grounds for mercenary troops is now more than occupied by a great military nation, that has too much employment for its own sons, to permit of their giving military service to other countries. Besides this, in the

Peninsular war, we fought the battle of oppressed Europe, and so drew into our Army those, who, hating French rule, were consequently unable to remain in their own homes, and therefore took service in our army.

It is a comparatively modern idea that battles are to be fought by men trained exclusively for war, and that the mass of the nation is to look on whilst its life and honour are defended by a portion only of its representatives. In the ancient republics of Greece and Italy it was the duty, and even the exclusive privilege of the citizens to bear arms, and not until the decline of Roman liberties did paid legionaries take the place of the levies of the free inhabitants of the great city. Conscription, properly enforced, compels all classes to bear their share of military duty, and those armies have been most formidable that have included in their ranks representatives from every portion of the nation. The troops of the French Republic which the Great Napoleon led into Italy, the German army that conquered at Sadowa and at Sedan, were types of the nations they fought for, being composed of every element of which they were formed. Excellent as the English regular army is, it yet lacks the elasticity which gives scope for all the warlike energy of the people; and when a serious war tries the nation, a loss of strength will ensue unless every class pays its share of the blood as well as of the money contributions.

I have now endeavoured to establish two theses: first, that a representative body of volunteers in a military expedition beyond the seas, would be of great service to the force itself; and secondly, that they would add to the strength of the army of which they would form a part, whilst, indirectly, both as benefiting the volunteer force, and as bringing prominently to the front the middle classes of the community, they would materially increase the fighting power of the nation. It now remains for me to endeavour to indicate how such a force might be raised, and here I must ask for the indulgence and forbearance of those who are so much better acquainted with the subject than I am, presuming on the fact that sometimes the ignorant, from a want of knowledge of difficulties, may strike out a line which those who are brought face to face with them, cannot venture to pursue. In a discussion on the recent mobilization scheme, and the place allotted to the volunteers in the defence of the country, I heard a distinguished Colonel of one of the best metropolitan corps make the remark that he quite approved of the force being at first placed in fortresses or entrenched positions, as he felt sure that if they were subsequently found fit for the field, the Generals in command would be too glad to have them. Mr. Hoste, in the able paper which he read at this Institution, pointed out the desirability of dividing the force into a first line and a reserve; and this idea has been advocated by Lord Elcho, and I believe already partially carried out in so far that the force of some of the regiments is strengthened by a register of men who have passed through the ranks, and who are willing to serve again in the event of war. I would propose to enlarge on this scheme, and endeavour in peace time to provide for an organization that might be utilised in providing a force ready for immediate war. In every regiment of

Volunteers a roll of men might be prepared who would be willing in case of hostilities to serve abroad, say for a limited time; these men should pledge themselves to attain to a higher pitch of efficiency than their comrades, by attending a larger number of drills; they should be passed as medically fit for service, and should be certified as being effective soldiers by the Inspecting Officers at the yearly inspections of the regiments. As there are about 165,000 enrolled and efficient infantry volunteers, two per cent. would give a force of upwards of 3,500, or very nearly a brigade; whilst if a really popular war should break out, and (with the present extension of the franchise) no war not popular could be undertaken, this number would be rapidly increased. It may be objected that under the most favourable aspect the force raised would be small; but as I have already endeavoured to point out, mere numbers do not measure its real value. The yeast that leavens the dough is insignificant in quantity, but its effects are unmistakeably great, and the first expeditionary force sent abroad would in all probability form the nucleus of considerable reinforcements as the nation warmed to its work, and as the strain of war closed many of the outlets for labour, which peaceful civilization opens for the middle classes of society. For it must not be forgotten that a serious conflict would necessitate great sacrifices and many economies, and that those who minister to the refinements of life would find less demand for their labour. There are, also, in all vigorous communities many young men whom the prospect of military service arouses from idleness and pleasure, and who would willingly engage in a force where they would find friends and companions of their own condition, although they might be unwilling to embrace a purely military career by enlisting into the regular army; for although it may be said, that if these young fellows are so fond of soldiering, they had better take service in the ordinary way, the fact remains that they will not do so. Even among the most military nations, where conscription is the law of the land, some escape is afforded to the sons of the gentry by means of a cadet service; and I think few will be prepared to say that, except under the pressure of the most imminent danger, the sons of our gentry, of our tradesmen, and of our farmers, will enlist in any large numbers into the regular Army or the Militia. We must deal with facts as we find them, and I am inclined to believe that this is a fact that few will be prepared to contest.

Supposing it were possible in peace time to form any approximate idea of the numbers of a force raised from the volunteers, companies might be organized on paper from regiments that have an affinity to to each other, and the proper officers nominated to command them. Certain regiments, either from social similitude or from local influences, establish ties which it might be well to recognise, and so whilst providing for uniformity in the total force raised, some consideration might be given to the inclinations of the volunteers in the divisions of the brigade into battalions and companies. To guard against the interference that the organization of such a force might cause to the recruiting for the Army and the militia, and to the possibility of ambitious men raising companies and regiments to obtain commis-

sions, I would forbid any but efficient volunteers being enrolled in it; so that at the outset of hostilities the brigade for service would be selected solely from those who had made themselves efficient members of their corps during time of peace.

A notable instance of a large portion of an army being raised from a class similar to that which forms our volunteers, may be found in the troops of the Southern States of America that commenced the war with the victory of Bull Run. There, might be seen companies raised by wealthy men, who recognizing in themselves a want of military experience took service in the ranks, whilst the private soldiers came into camp attended by their slaves, who, exempt from military discipline, enjoyed more freedom than their masters. As the war developed into larger proportions, those who survived the first battles returned with the experience gained on service and raised fresh companies and regiments, which they were able to command as officers and non-commissioned officers. And thus the country benefited not only by the example set by the upper classes, and by their actual fighting powers, but by the training afforded to men who in other respects were well qualified to serve as officers. In a minor degree (as the war at its commencement was less national) the Northern States furnished regiments composed of men who could compare with those who fill the ranks of the best of our volunteer regiments. I have frequently seen a regiment from New York (recruited from what may be considered a wealthy class) engaged in some of the hardest work of a siege, and it certainly was not among such troops that breeches of discipline occurred. In neither of the instances quoted had however the volunteer regiments the advantage of serving side by side with regulars, a defect in organization inseparable from the constitution of the American armies, but one which led to terrible disaster: for I would insist with great stress on the necessity of this description of force being limited to a small proportion only of the Army. After months of drill and of discipline the proportion might doubtless be increased, but nothing can compensate for any want of the elements of stability, which discipline, training, and, I may add, professional instincts, can alone insure.

For the regimental Officers of such a force I would provide in the same way as for the men, only greater care should be taken in their selection. Not only should they be well instructed in drill, but they should be men known in their regiments as possessing power of command and qualities that would bear the test of actual service. If they have had the advantage of training in the regular army, so much the better; but there are qualities which no training can give, but which seem to be born with men, and which are instinctively felt by those who are brought in contact with them. The field of selection would probably be large, as the number of Officers required would be but few, and in the event of active employment no hesitation should be felt in summarily getting rid of any who might be incompetent. The less highly trained a force is, the better should be its Officers. There are many men who can command creditably a regiment in perfect order, and possessing all its proper links of responsibility: but there are but

few who can lead and impress a character on a force such as our Indian irregular regiments. I use this example as the nearest at hand, and as serving to describe the class of men to whom should be granted the privilege of officering a force such as it is proposed to organize. There would, I believe, be little difficulty in finding properly qualified men for this responsible position. In the volunteers are many ex-Officers of the regular Army, who have seen service in the field and who are young and energetic; and although, as I have just said, this qualification should not be insisted upon, it should still carry considerable weight, and should constitute a claim for selection provided other requirements were fulfilled. Similar arguments would apply in a minor degree to the non-commissioned Officers, but as in all probability several of the young men who would enrol themselves would already hold that grade, although prepared to resign it and to serve as privates, there would be a considerable scope for selection on the assembly of the force prior to embarkation.

It may, perhaps, be contended that the regiments would lack cohesion, that men would not know their Officers, and that it would take a considerable time before the units could be welded into a cohesive mass. But it must be remembered, that I am speaking of a time when a prospect of war would add an indescribable stimulant to exertion, and when, consequently, as much could be done in one day as in a week or month of ordinary life. I am also taking for granted that the ingredients of such a force, selected from so large a body as the volunteers now are, would be of no common order, and that each and all being actuated by similar motives, the fortnight or so in camp or in barracks previous to embarkation under an energetic staff, would be able to work wonders. The system of drilling regiments of volunteers in brigade, would give the opportunity to men of becoming acquainted with each other in peace time. The young fellows, whose names were enrolled as willing to serve in war, would soon be known throughout the brigade, they would probably be inspected together whenever it assembled for drill, and thus the men of the companies would not be strangers to each other. A few days in a transport, and a still fewer before an enemy would cement the union already formed, and would create ties that years of peaceful life would fail to form. A similar objection may also be found to apply to the regular Army, when regiments for embarkation are often swamped by draughts of men totally unacquainted with each other or with their Officers. It can, therefore, be overcome, especially under the favourable conditions of a force composed as that we are dealing with, and I think the difficulty may be regarded as more ideal than real.

A place would, of course, be indicated for the brigade to assemble at when war appeared imminent, probably near London or Aldershot, where arms, clothing, and equipment would be served out, and where its organisation, previous to embarkation, might be completed. It would be desirable that the uniform should be assimilated in all essentials to that of the Army, and that the men once assembled should, in every respect, be dealt with as regular soldiers. There would be no difficulty in discipline if the reins were in proper hands, as

most of the ingredients that conduce to it would be present in full force. *Esprit de corps* would be very strong. Education and intelligence would enable men to comprehend the meaning and necessity of orders, and all would feel that not only was the honour of their regiment and brigade entrusted to them, but that they were the representatives of the 185,000 volunteers from whose ranks they had been picked, and who were themselves, in all probability, making ready to take their part in the defensive organisation of the country; and were, consequently, watching as soldiers the behaviour of their more fortunate comrades. I can conceive no more favourable conditions for inculcating discipline and for completing organisation. How such a force should be managed, trained, and brought into the field can be studied in the recently published and most interesting memoirs of the Count de Segur, where, as the close of the great struggle, that—following the retreat from Russia—culminated in the battles before Paris, that admirable Officer was ordered to raise, organise, and equip regiments of young men drawn from the royalist families of Normandy and Brittany. How he succeeded and how these regiments proved in action the value of their training will also best be learnt by a perusal of the same volumes.

It is scarcely necessary to say that the force proposed to be raised from the volunteers should be treated in every way whilst on service as regular troops, they would be under the Mutiny Act, and would receive the regulated pay and allowances. In fact, whilst serving they would be regarded as regular troops, only I would venture to suggest that if they proved fit for duties in the field they should be pushed well to the front and not left in garrison. This privilege, I think, they might venture to ask for, and I doubt whether any jealousy would be created by according it to them.

I have now briefly, and I fear incompletely, brought under your notice the first part of the scheme, which is comprised under the heading of this paper; but before discussing the second portion of the subject, I would desire to answer an objection that I foresee may be made. There are three great organisations that compose our Army, the regulars, the militia, and the volunteers, and it may be said that I am unduly exalting the third at the expense of the second. But to this I would reply, that one of the bases of my argument lies in the assertion that the volunteers represent a class in the community, which—unless conscription be enforced—is not found in either the regulars or the militia, and that it is to utilise this force and to give it additional vitality, that I propose to place a small portion of it in the first line; whilst I would quote (to strengthen my arguments) the great benefit that accrued to the militia from the sending of several regiments to garrison our fortresses in the Mediterranean during the Crimean war. If that war had continued and expanded, doubtless these regiments (excellent in every way, and by the training and practice they had had, fit to take their place in the field) would have been pushed to the front. The same result would, I venture to say, occur in any future great war, and the militia regiments need not fear lest they should be ignored, if—and this admits of no doubt—they

attain to the standard of efficiency which their comrades of 1855 and 1856 reached. There is room for all in a serious war, and wealthy England need not be afraid that she will be called upon to equip more soldiers than she can afford to bring into the field. I contend that she has never tapped a most rich mine, and that in place of subsidizing other countries and engaging mercenaries, she ought to utilise to the utmost her own children, especially when so many of them will be only too eager to fight for her.

To turn to the second portion of the subject, namely, the employment of a Colonial force to act with our regular Army.

The facilities of communication, and the increased intercourse between portions of the globe separated from each other by what were formerly considered as vast distances, have tended to bring our great colonies into far closer union with the mother country than in past days. Time, has, in fact, been completely annihilated, and the instantaneous transmission of intelligence augments the interest that those who look on, have for those who are engaged in war; whilst rapidity of communication affords means of giving practical expression to their feelings of sympathy. The connection between England and Canada has become very close, every event is telegraphed, and if the occurrence of a fog in London affords a paragraph in an Ottawa evening paper of the same day, much more will any circumstance that touches on the interests of England find an immediate echo throughout the Colony. A war in which England were engaged, would stir to the depths the feeling of loyalty and the love of home that are such marked characteristics of Canadians, and there would be a universal desire to do more than merely look on as spectators of any struggle in which we might be involved. A few days ago a telegram from Canada announced that a field battery at Toronto had volunteered for service in the event of England going to war, and it is probable that many other portions of the Canadian Militia would, under such circumstances, be eager to cast in their lot with the British Army.

Owing partly to a general belief that in consequence of the good feeling existing between England and the United States, and the peaceful aspect of affairs throughout the great Republic, no need exists of military preparation, the Canadian Militia has gradually been reduced in number, and I must say in efficiency. The last report shows that they consist of not more than 23,000 actually exercised during the preceding year, and the period of training extends only to twelve days for artillery and eight days for the other branches of the service. When I add that there is no permanent and paid staff of any description below a brigade major, a notion may be arrived at, of the general condition of the force if measured by a European standard. "At the same time" (to quote General Selby Smyth's report) "it must be borne in mind that the active militia is but the "advanced guard of the Army of Canada in case a general call to "arms should ever occur. The real force of the country would then "be represented by the reserve militia amounting by law to some "600,000 men." From this larger basis of supply, the troops who

might enrol themselves for foreign service could be drawn, and it must be remembered, that although no portion of the force might be highly trained, the Canadians possess, in a marked degree, qualities calculated to make excellent soldiers. They are hardy, industrious, accustomed to rough work, and handy in dealing with the many exigencies of colonial life. They are also easily subjected to discipline, and willing to submit to the authority which they recognise as necessary for military efficiency. The various descriptions of labour in which they are engaged, and their habit of adapting themselves to different conditions of life, make them peculiarly fitted for many of the requirements of soldiers on service. In the Red River Expedition, under a leader whom they respected and admired, they performed excellent service, and the manner in which they overcame the many difficulties that beset their path through the wilderness, showed that in a very high degree they possessed the qualifications of excellent troops. During the Fenian raid, I have been assured on the authority of the Officer who so ably commanded the Red River Expedition, that their cavalry, under Colonel Denison, of Toronto (well known as a writer of a treatise on that arm) performed most valuable service in watching a wide extent of country, whilst the manner in which their field batteries worked and manœuvre, gives a proof that the habits of driving so universal in Canada and the States, can be turned to good account for military purposes. In fact, there is no better material for making soldiers than is to be found in Canada, and I may add—if the maritime population of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and the semi-maritime navigators of the inland seas be taken into consideration—there would be found ample materials for adding to our seamen. That there is a warlike spirit in the country is shown by the popularity of the militia and the willingness with which they turn out on the prospect of anything like service. But peace tends to rust their arms, and the absence of any regular troops to furnish a standard of excellence, leads to a gradual diminution of efficiency. If, however, England should be engaged in war, and if the services of a few regiments of Canadians were asked for, I feel sure that the call would be warmly answered, and that a body of troops, which, in a short time would reach a high state of efficiency, would be ready to embark for service wherever they might be required. In accepting their services, Canada should be treated as an equal, the force ought to be taken with its own Officers, and if sufficiently advanced, the New Military School at Kingston should be utilised, to furnish a portion at least of the necessary staff. Possibly some regular Officer, known in Canada, might be appointed to the command, but the Colony should be encouraged to organise, equip, and officer its own troops. When once on board ship they would come under the Mutiny Act, and be paid by England, possibly, also, it would be well that a portion of their equipments and arms should be furnished to them by the mother country, but the political as well as the material benefit accruing from such a force, would, in a great measure, depend on its organization being Colonial, *i.e.*, that it should not consist merely of soldiers recruited and paid for by the mother country, but that it should be a

force placed at her disposal by a great colony, anxious to show that it recognised among the duties that a grown up child owes to its parent —the noble one of contributing to its defence.

It is, of course, impossible to estimate what numbers could and would be sent, as they would partly depend on the popularity of the war, partly on the condition of affairs in the colony. It is also difficult to indicate the class of men who would volunteer for the service. The Canadian Militia have an affinity to our volunteers as well as to our militia, and the regiments vary greatly in their composition. Some are induced to enlist into the active militia by the pay—a somewhat higher rate than is afforded directly to our troops—whilst others engage from the love of the service and from the incentives of duty. There is also a great difference between regiments raised in the several provinces of the Dominion, and in regard to present efficiency much depends on the opportunities that the propinquity of the villages from which the companies are enrolled, gives for drill. Probably a force for foreign service would comprise regiments representing the various elements from which the present militia is raised; and if, at the first start, two regiments of infantry could be equipped in Ontario, one in Quebec, and one in the maritime provinces, with perhaps a couple of batteries of artillery and three squadrons of cavalry mounted on Canadian horses, an excellent commencement might be made for future organization. If this force distinguished itself before the enemy, which it would be well nigh sure to do, the prestige that it would afford to the Canadian Army would be very great, whilst the additional and noble tie that community of danger and suffering would furnish, would do more to bind the colony to the mother country than years of negotiations and of mutual arrangements. I can imagine no finer troops than could be raised from the backwoodsmen and lumberers, who seek a livelihood in the Canadian forests during the winter months, and who, when the freshet or spring liberates the waters, are engaged in navigating the rafts down the rapids of the great tributaries of the St. Lawrence. Their life in the shanties accustoms them to discipline and to an organized system of working. Their gang leaders have much of the training of non-commissioned Officers, whilst the various descriptions of labour on which men are employed, call forth the energy, the intelligence, and the resource which are invaluable in soldiers. To build huts, to make roads, to bridge streams, to construct rafts, and to navigate them under difficulties, form their yearly work (which by the way they do entirely on tea); whilst the necessity of depending on each other for mutual support and assistance, gives a species of *camaradery* much resembling that of men serving together in a regiment or a company.

I feel, however, that I am going into details which are beyond the scope of this paper. What I desire to impress on you is, the mutual benefit that would result from a Colonial or Canadian force; for the great Australian colonists appear as yet to be too far removed by time and distance to enable them directly to subsidize our army for European war. They might possibly be able to furnish assistance in other ways, and an Australian fleet in the Pacific, or Australian troops in some

of our important garrisons, would relieve our ships and soldiers from a distant duty and permit of their utilization nearer home. But to revert to my subject. England would benefit directly by the addition of an excellent body of troops to her army, and Canada would derive an advantage similar to that which Sardinia gained by sending her small but well-equipped army to the Crimea, whilst both would profit by the mutual respect and affection which community of danger engenders. From what I know of Canada, and from what I hear from those who are well-informed as to the feelings of the colony, I do not think these views are Utopian, or that their realization would be impossible. That difficulties might arise, and that considerations of expense might have to be duly weighed, I have little doubt, but the end in view would justify some departure from ordinary usages, and would encourage those who might undertake the carrying out of the scheme to more than common exertion. The choice of proper agents is of the utmost importance, and would require some caution, as there are always to be found plenty of men, especially perhaps in the colonies, who are ready to propose and willing to promise anything, whilst the real thorough workers, and people of standing and influence keep in the background. But these are mere incidents common to any new and important enterprise. I have ventured merely to propound the scheme, and leaving it to abler men to criticise it, to alter it, and, in fact, to lick it into shape. My object is to direct attention to the desirability of encouraging our almost grown-up children to assist the mother State, and to the necessity of taking the broader views of the mperial power of England, that our empire, vastly enlarged since the ast great war, justifies us in adopting.

It may be objected that in this paper I have mixed up two subjects, and that the employment of a brigade of English volunteers is quite apart from the utilization of a Colonial force; but I would submit that the two schemes have their origin in a similar principle. A European war in which Great Britain might be engaged would probably not be on a small scale. It would be waged with powerful nations, organized so that every able-bodied man might be brought under arms. It would be fought under unknown conditions, as the weapons which science has introduced, especially in regard to naval warfare, make us appreciate David's remark when he gazed on the armour that Saul offered him. It would necessitate the strain of every nerve, the employment of every resource, and the utilization of every advantage.

It has consequently been my endeavour in this paper to indicate two latent forces that have hitherto been allowed to lie dormant. The first, a means of utilizing our middle classes, and of imbuing with an increased element of vitality the Army (for I can term it nothing else) that gives an outlet to their military enthusiasm; the second an idea of bringing into closer union for mutual protection and for mutual support, the great colonies and the mother country. I know that both these schemes have been but roughly sketched, and perhaps ignorantly dealt with, but if the paper I have just read will lead to thought and criticism, it will not be worthless, neither will the time

you have so kindly accorded me have been thrown away. The subject is one of great importance, and in testing the value of the schemes put forward, no mere professional difficulties, or desire of preserving intact old bottles at the expense of new wine should be allowed to cloud th broad views of imperial defence that alone can lead to a proper appreciation of all the resources that England possesses for a serious war.

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